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ABSTRACT: Argumentation scholars' interest in the work of Charles Sanders Peirce has been almost exclusively
confined to his conception of abduction, and he is not currently regarded as a key figure for development of
argumentation. This paper examines his notion of sign and semiotics and their relation to inference and argument, and
argues that semiosis and sign, along with abduction, should be the focus for argumentation scholars' research on
Peirce.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Although recent writing by Walton (2004) indicates an increasing interest among argumentation
scholars in the work of Charles Sanders Peirce, to date the central focus of the research has been on
his concept of abduction. In contrast, Peirce's contribution to semiotics, the humanistic or
scientific study of signs, has been significant to scholars in fields other than argumentation. He is
no doubt one of the founding fathers of the field along with Ferdinand de Saussure, and his insight
has influenced literary theory and media studies (Sebeok and Umiker-Sebeok 1984; Ishida 2004).
Given that Peirce attempted to align logic with semiotics (2. 227), 1 it is strange that argumentation
scholars focus only on his notions of abduction and exclude semiotics from the scope of research.
In this paper, I describe some key components of his semiotics and argue that semiotics should be
the focus of research on Peirce in the field of argumentation. More specifically, I will consider his
notion of semiosis and sign – two key concepts of his semiotics – and attempt to answer the
following questions: What are semiotics, semiosis and sign? How are they related to the theory and
history of argumentation? What contribution can his notions of semiosis and sign can make to
theory and history of argumentation? Section 2 of the paper describes the current state of
scholarship in argumentation on Peirce and also examines the use of word "pragma/pragmatic"
among argumentation scholars. Section 3 interrogates Peirce's conception of semiosis and sign.
Section 4 explores the implications of Peircean conceptions of semiosis and sign on the theory and
history of argumentation. Section 5 offers conclusions and recommendations for further research.
2. ARGUMENTATION THEORISTS ON CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE
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Before discussing Peirce's notion of sign and semiotics, this section of the paper examines the
current argumentation scholars' take on Peirce and gives an account why they perceive Peirce as
they do now. The coverage of the relevant literature is not meant to be exhaustive, but it still covers
well-known positions. The three threads of this section are: the history of argumentation, the
pragma/pragmatic theory of argumentation, and abduction.
Since the renaissance of argumentation as a field of inquiry and its professionalization
starting in the late 1970s (marked by symposiums and conferences in Canada, the US and the
Netherlands), argumentation scholars have made several attempts to construct historical narratives
of argumentation. Sadly, Peirce is not mentioned as an important figure in history of argumentation.
Among scholars associated with informal logic, Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair have
co-authored several articles describing how informal logic developed as a theoretical and
pedagogical enterprise (1980, 1985, 1987, 1994, 1996, 1997, 2000). According to their
historicizing of informal logic and argumentation, the origin of informal logic can be traced back
to Aristotle's Topica and On Sophistical Refutations. Stephen Toulmin, Chaim Perelman and Lucie
Olbrechts-Tyteca, and Charles Hamblin started the renaissance of argumentation as a theoretical
inquiry in the twentieth century. In the pedagogical realm, Howard Kahane, Stephen Thomas, and
Michael Scriven are the key people who called our attention to argumentation in natural language.
Despite some dissent on the name "informal logic," panelists at Informal Logic at 25 Conference –
Robert Binkley, Blair and Johnson, Robert Ennis, Trudy Govier, David Hitchcock, Douglas
Walton, and John Woods – did not dispute this line of standard historical account.2 If we expand
historical accounts given by pragma-dialecticians and rhetorical and communication theorists of
argumentation, we will find similar accounts. Toulmin and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca usually
appear as key figures of reactivating the field, 3 and scholars in different disciplines started to
develop various theories of argument since the late 1970s. In short, suffice it to say that Charles
Sanders Peirce does not have any space as one of the key persons in the history of argumentation as
a field of inquiry.
Another important thread is the phrase "pragma/pragmatic." Although Peirce has not been
perceived to be the key figure in the community of argumentation scholars, the word
"pragma/pragmatic" was fairly widely used. Douglas Walton's Informal Logic, van Eemeren and
Grootendorst's Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussion and Johnson's Manifest Rationality use
"pragma/pragmatic" as the key label for their theoretical accounts of argumentation. Broadly
speaking, pragmatic theories of argument and argumentation emphasize the purpose of
argumentative dialogues or argumentative practices to evaluate adequacy of the claim-support
complex used in those dialogues or practices. In using the phrase "pragma/pragmatic," they
explicitly or implicitly buy into the triadic distinction of syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic offered
by Morris (1938), but do not go further than that to mention Peirce – by whom Morris was inspired
to create that triadic distinction. In contrasting logical semantics with logical pragmatics at the
beginning of Informal Logic, Walton (1989, p. 1) does not refer to Morris. However, the distinction
between semantic and pragmatic, and the association of pragmatics with use of propositions in
2
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dialogical settings seem to draw on Morris' pragmatics. Van Eemeren (1990) refers to the empirical
pragmatics of discourse analytic approach to argumentation as well as the normative pragmatics of
argumentation exemplified by pragma-dialectics. The use of pragmatics, not pragmatism, seems to
indicate that he buys into Morris' idea. When Johnson (1996, p. 104) first labeled his theory of
argument pragmatic, he mentioned Peirce's "Fixation of Belief" to show a parallel between
pragmatic theory of argument and pragmatism. In his later work (2000, p. 149, pp. 368-369), while
relying on Peirce's emphasis on the purpose of an action, he emphasized Morris' distinction
between syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic. In this respect, pragmatic in Johnson's sense seems to
shift back and forth between Peirce and Morris. In short, although Peirce was the founder of
pragmatism which emphasized practice of scientific reasoning, it is Morris who gets more credit
for pragmatic approach to argumentation than Peirce.
The last important thread is Peirce on abduction. Since the beginning of informal logic and
argumentation, the search for non-deductive and non-standard-inductive inference has been an
item of the research agenda (Johnson and Blair 1980, pp. 22-23). Blair (1999, pp. 56-57) has
argued that Scriven's probative reasoning or Walton's presumptive reasoning would fall into the
third class of inference. In this historical background, Walton (2004, p. 36) has written a
monograph on abduction, and argued that presumptive reasoning or Rescher's plausible reasoning
focus on "a process of discussion of an issue, a process of collecting data, or both," under which
abduction is situated. He goes on to extend Peirce's abduction outside scientific reasoning and
applies it to the realm of artificial intelligence and legal reasoning. His discussion and extension of
abduction gives us strong evidence that abduction is a proper research topic for argumentation
scholars. Given that argumentation scholars in the last thirty years have searched for a third class
of inference or reasoning in argument, Peirce's conception of abduction was far ahead of its time in
discussing this issue. Since Walton's goal in writing the monograph is to theorize abduction rather
than justify Peirce as an argumentation scholar, he does not address this latter topic. His goal has
probably prevented us from recognizing Peirce to be as important as Toulmin, Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca, and Hamblin to theory and history of argumentation.
The three threads seem to lead us to conclude that argumentation scholars have not fully
perceived the significance of Peirce in theory and history of argumentation. If we consider that his
research program encompasses such ideas as practicality in pragmatic-maxim, intersubjectivity,
non-deductive/non-inductive reasoning, and sign and semiosis, the current dismissal of Peirce
among argumentation scholars is, at least, to be deplored. However, a question arises why
argumentation scholars are where they are, in terms of scholarship on Peirce. A fully elaborated
account is beyond the scope of this paper, but the following three lines of support can plausibly
explain the current state of affairs. 4 First and foremost, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders
Peirce were not organized in such a way that would call our attention to Peirce's consideration of
different types of signs, semiotics and semiosis in light of reasoning. Since no volume centers
around his ideas on sign and semiotics, readers have to reconstruct and make sense of his ideas on
signs and reasoning by reading different parts of Collected Papers. Therefore, many
argumentation scholars may have not realized the significance of such conceptions of signs and
semiotics to theory of argumentation. Even if they had realized it, it must have been really difficult
to reconstruct Peirce's ideas into a meaningful whole from bits and pieces scattered in the multiple
volumes. Secondly, the way argumentation scholars with a background in philosophy perceived
4
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Peirce might have blocked inquiries into scholarship on Peirce. Argumentation scholars in the
philosophical discipline must have taken or taught courses on Peirce, but those courses are more
likely to center around pragmatism, logic, or philosophy of science than his ideas on semiotics.
Since the idea that Peirce was the founder of pragmatism has been historically constructed in the
community of philosophers, it would have been difficult for them to see different aspects of Peirce.
Thirdly, the trajectory of research on semiotics has developed without emphasis on argument as
the artifact for study. Semiotics as a field of inquiry has developed in the fields of humanities, such
as literary studies, visual studies, film studies, or cultural studies, and argumentation has not been a
main focal point of the research project of semiotics. Given the way semiotics developed over
years, it is unlikely that argumentation scholars have studied and applied it to argumentation. 5
These three lines of reasoning jointly explain why Peirce has been an unperceived figure and has
not been valued as highly as Toulmin, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, and Hamblin. In the
following two sections, this paper will attempt to reformulate argumentation scholars' perception
on Peirce drawing on his ideas on semiotics, semiosis, and sign.
3. PEIRCE ON SEMIOTICS, SEMIOSIS, AND SIGN
For reformulating our understanding of Peirce, this section of the paper summarizes his conception
of semiotics, semiosis and sign. Initially, semiotics as a research project is briefly described. Next,
his conception of semiosis, a general process of sign use, is described with emphasis on
interpretant and unlimited semiosis. Then, various types of signs are laid out as a basis for further
interrogation in the next section.
3.1 Peircean Semiotics and Semiosis
Peirce regards logic as another name of semiotic, and semiotic is "the quasi-necessary, or formal
doctrine of signs" (2.227). He aligns his semiotics with empirical science—his main research
project—when he explains the meaning of quasi-necessary:
By describing the doctrine as "quasi-necessary," or formal, I mean that we observe the characters of such signs as
we know, and from such an observation, by a process which I will not object to naming Abstraction, we are led to
statements, eminently fallible, and therefore in one sense by no means necessary, as to what must be the characters
of all signs used by a "scientific" intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence capable of learning by experience.
(2.227)

Empirical observation and abstraction by scientific intelligence does not achieve necessity as
mathematics does, and leaves room for fallibility, which requires further observation and
abstraction. This passage shows that his semiotics seems to fit well with his philosophy of
empirical science, the intellectual activity conducted by the community of scientific inquirers.
One crucial conception to understand Peircean semiotics is semiosis: a triadic relationship
among object, sign/representamen, and interpretant. He states: "But by 'semiosis' I mean, on the
contrary, an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of three subjects, such as a
sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into
5
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actions between pairs" (5.484). His refusal to reducing semiosis into a binary relationship is
consistent with his triadic category of firstness, secondness, and thirdness. 6 Peirce summarizes the
triadic semiosis in the following way: "A sign stands for something to the idea which it produces,
or modifies" (1.339). For example, the linguistic sign 'hot dog' stands for something that baseball
spectators eat at the ballpark watching a Detroit Tigers game, and the sign may produce ideas of
North American food or professional sports. In understanding his classification of signs offered in
the next section, this process of semiosis plays a key role, for the classification is closely linked
with semiosis.
Before moving on to Peirce's classification of signs, there are two remarks to be made on the
semiosis. One feature unique to his conception of semiosis is that of interpretant. Interpretant is
another sign that the original sign/representamen produces. He states: "(t)hat sign which it creates
I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that
object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the
ground of the representamen" (2.228). The conception of interpretant, as a second sign created by
the original sign, seems to allow for room for different interpretations of a sign by different
individuals. 7
Suppose that George W. Bush, a resident in Tuvalu, and an environmental business
entrepreneur read a report on the greenhouse effect and the global warming. The report, in its
totality, constitutes a sign standing for increase in temperature. What interpretant does the sign
create in the mind of these three persons? George W. Bush may think, "Well, even if the report is
true, limiting the emission of CO2 is detrimental to the US industry and the people, so I will
dismiss it." To the resident of Tuvalu, a country located only five meters above the sea level, the
report can be a critical warning. She or he might think about moving out of the country. To the
environmental business entrepreneur, the report can be an indication of new business opportunities.
She or he may come up with a new, innovative business plan that covers carbon dioxide emission
rights. This example illustrates that the original sign standing for the global temperature can
produce different interpretants.
The other feature to be noted about Peircean semiosis is its infinity. If the interpretant is a
second sign that the original sign produces, there is no reason why the process should stop there. A
second sign may create a third sign, which in turn creates a fourth sign, which in turn creates still
another. The process goes on and on and on. Semiosis becomes an unlimited, never-ending,
growing process that becomes part of a new semiotic process. Peirce himself acknowledges this ad
infinitum process of semiosis (2.303), and Eco (1976, p. 68) calls it "unlimited semiosis.” 8 The
sign and the interpretant of one semiotic process become part of the object that the new sign stands
for.
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Firstness, secondness, and thirdness are three modes of being. Firstness concerns "that which is such as it is,
positively and without reference to anything else." Secondness concerns "that which is such as it is, with respect to a
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relation to each other" (8.329). They are also respectively associated with the quality, the actual fact, and the law
(1.418-1.420). Firstness can exist without secondness or thirdness. Secondness can exist without thirdness, but cannot
exist without firstness. Thirdness needs both firstness and secondness for its existence (1.353). Although it is beyond
the scope of this paper to fully elaborate his conceptions of firstness, secondness, and thirdness, it is important to
understand that his semiotics is based upon this triadic category.
7
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signifier and the signified, so the interpretation process seems to be deterministic.
8
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Fig. 1: Nike© logo

Fig. 2: A T-shirt at Amsterdam

Fig. 3: Souvenirs at Hakodate

The above figures exemplify the unlimited semiosis. When people familiar with sports gears
encounter figures 2 and 3, the interpretants that those figures produce are probably influenced by
previous semiosis involving the Nike logo. The Nike logo could produce different
interpretants—exploitation of cheap labor, cool sports gears, Michael Jordan, or a successful
business, to name just a few. This semiotic process becomes part of another semiotic processes that
involves "just did it IN AMSTERDAM" T-shirt. For those who already know the Nike logo, figure
2 may function as a humor. However, for a feminist who only knows about the prostitution
industry in Amsterdam, this T-shirt may reminds her of the unfair depiction between men and
women. Figure 3 also incorporates the Nike logo in creating the sign, which also functions as a
humor like figure 2. If a viewer of this souvenir knows about Hakodate, a northern city in Japan
famous for fishery, the crab claw in the Nike-like logo might produce some ideas in her or his mind.
The semiotic processes involving figures 2 and 3 jointly mean something to the genre of humor.
Each of the semiotic processes are intertwined and with each other, and they collectively constitute
a web of signs in which humans do their sign-using activities.
Figure 4: Summary of three semiotic processes
object

sign/representamen

Nike logo
A T-shirt at
Amsterdam

Nike the company
the logo
sex industry (and the
the T-shirt
representamen of Nike
logo)
Souvenirs at Hakodate fishery (and the
the souvenir
representamen of Nike
logo)

interpretant

varies 9
varies

varies

The description of the interpretant and the unlimited semiosis unfolds that the human world
exists in the web of signs, and that Peircean semiotics is significant for scholars in various
disciplines. In fact, Eco (1976, p. 5) refers to a possibility of a general semiotic discipline under
which different scholarly inquiries into signs can be situated. Although a general semiotic
discipline may be a nonstarter given the socio-political impediments of academic institutions,
suffice it to say that his statement reveals the importance of Peircean semiotics to the scholarly
9

As for a sign used in empirical science, various interpretants that a sign produces will probably reduce to a single
interpretant as time goes by. However, in case of signs used outside of science will allow more room for different
interpretations.
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community.
3.2 Peircean Signs
Peirce conceives of signs based on his triadic category of firstness, secondness and thirdness
on the one hand, and his triadic semiosis of object, sign and interpretant on the other. Therefore, his
ontological system is strongly linked with his conception of signs. He divides signs according to
"the sign in itself", "the relation of the sign to its object", and "its Interpretant" (2.243). This
division, coupled with his triadic categories, produces the following three trichotomies:
Figure 5: Peirce's classification of signs 10

firstness
secondness
thirdness

sign in itself

sign-object

sign-interpretant

qualisign
sinsign
legisign

icon
index
symbol

rheme
dicent
argument

The first trichotomy of signs concerns sign in itself. A sign exists and functions in the
semiosis, but it is still a sign in and of itself. The first trichotomy is constituted by a qualisign, a
sinsign, and a legisign. A qualisign is "a quality which is a Sign. It cannot act as a sign until it is
embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character as a sign" (2.244). The
qualisign exists as the potential quality to be a sign. When the quality of the sign is not actually
observed, it exists even without the embodiment. A sinsign is "an actual existent thing or event
which is a sign," and it involves a qualisign or several qualisigns, for the actual thing or event
should possess certain qualities (2.245). A legisign is "a law that is a Sign. This law is usually
established by men [sic]." Since it is "a general type," it signifies "through an instance of its
application." In other words, the legisign needs the sinsign (the Replica) every time it functions
(2.246). Among these three signs, the sinsign and the legisign are relevant to argumentation. If we
divide argumentation into conceptual, normative, and empirical studies of argument, the sinsign
concerns the empirical aspect, for it concerns the embodiment of the argumentation. In contrast,
the legisign is related to the conceptual and the normative aspects, for such conceptions as
argument, good argument, good argumentative exchange, and the criteria and the rules for
evaluating argument/argumentation are general law or conventions. Since qualisign is a quality of
sign and the embodiment has nothing to do with its character, it does not seem to be related to
argumentation.
The second trichotomy of signs concerns the relation between the sign and its object, and
Peirce states that this trichotomy is "the most fundamental division of signs" (2.275). This
trichotomy is based on the ways in which the sign stands for its object, and it is constituted by an
icon, an index, and a symbol. An icon is "a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes merely by
virtue of characters of its own, and which it possesses, just the same, whether any such Object
actually exists or not" (2.247). Since the icon represents the object by virtue of its character, the
representation is mainly achieved by its similarity to the object. Pierce lists images, diagrams and
metaphors as examples of the iconic sign. An index is "a sign which refers to the Object that it
denotes by virtue of being really affected by that Object" (2.248). The index requires the
10
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connection to the object for its representative function, and the connection is established either
through the existential or referential relations. Since the object influences the index, the index has
some common qualities to its object. Therefore, it involves an icon. Peirce lists demonstrative
pronouns (this and that), quantifiers (every, all, some, etc.), and prepositional phrases (on the
right/left of) as examples of the indexical sign. A symbol is "a sign which refers to the Object that
it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas, which operates to cause the
Symbol to be interpreted as referring to that Object" (2.249). For a symbol to perform its
representative function, resemblance or the physical connection is not important. What matters is
"the idea of symbol using-mind" that associates the symbol with the object (2.299). Although the
symbol is a law, it involves an icon and an index. Suppose that a woman walks on the street, sees a
balloon in the sky, and shouts, "Look at that balloon!" The statement is a symbol, for any ordinary
word is a symbol. However, "that balloon" is physically connected to the balloon in the sky, so it is
an icon. When she explains what a balloon is to her nephew, saying, "A balloon as something like
a soap bubble," she refers to its qualities embodied in individuals, so it involves an iconic sign.
Like the first trichotomy, the icon can exist without the index or the symbol. However, the symbol
needs the icon and the index for its existence. This trichotomy of sign concerns artifacts of
argumentation. Until recently, argumentation scholars studied argument in linguistic signs
(symbols). However, interest in visual argument has expanded the scope of argumentation to
include the iconic signs. The trajectory of research on argumentation indicates that both the icon
and the symbol are important to argumentation scholars.
The third trichotomy of signs concerns the relation between the sign and its interpretant. It is
constituted by a rheme, a dicisign, and an argument. 11 A rheme is "a Sign which, for its Interpretant,
is a Sign of qualitative Possibility, that is, is understood as representing such and such a kind of
possible Object" (2.250). For instance, "Socrates is __________." is a rheme, for it leaves the
object and functions as a sign of qualitative possibility, representing something potentially. A
dicisign is "a Sign, which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of actual existence" (2.251). In contrast to
the potentiality of the rheme, the dicisign emphasizes the actual existence. It is "either true or false,
but does not directly furnish reasons for its being so" (2.311). For example, "Socrates is a human."
is a proposition and an example of the dicisign. However, truth or falsity of this dicisign is not clear
without examining the reasons furnished for it. An argument is "a Sign which, for its Interpretant,
is a Sign of law" (2.252). Peirce's conception of argument is fairly traditional, which consists of the
premiss and the conclusion. The premiss is a dicisign, and the conclusion is its interpretant.
"Socrates is a human. Therefore, he is mortal." in an example of the argument. The first sentence,
the premiss, produces the second sentence, the conclusion, as a law. According to Peirce, this law
is what the argument urges, and "this 'urging' is the mode of representation proper to Arguments"
(2.253). As this example indicates, the argument involves the dicisign, so the inter-relationship
among the three types of sign exists also in this trichotomy. In this conception of argument, Peirce
situates deduction, induction, and abduction. Although his conception of argument is structural
and not "pragmatic" in the standard sense used among contemporary argumentation scholars for
lack of the reference to the purpose, it seems to be a fairly standard one among logicians.
The description of the sign based on the three trichotomies reveals that Peirce's theory of
sign is inextricably linked to his triadic category and semiosis. Also, each of the trichotomies
shows that: the signs liked to firstness are foundations for those linked to secondness and thirdness;
the signs linked to secondness are based on those linked to firstness, and becomes foundations for
11

Peirce respectively equates a rheme, a dicisign, and an argument with a term, a proposition, and an argument, which
sound less idiosyncratic and familiar to logicians and argumentation scholars (2.95).
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those linked to thirdness; and the signs linked to thirdness are based on those linked to firstness and
secondness. The first trichotomy helps us consider dimensions of the research on argumentation
and how they relate to the sign. The second trichotomy has some implications for artifacts of
argumentation. The third trichotomy is related to classification of inference or reasoning used in
argument.
4. CONTRIBUTION TO THEORY AND HISTORY OF ARGUMENTATION
The description of semiotics, semiosis, and signs in the previous section has become signs from
which different interpretants can be produced. Since the purpose of this paper is to discuss Peirce's
contribution to theory and history of argumentation, the interpretants to be produced should be
within these two substantive domains of argumentation. If Peirce had offered key ideas in
argumentation before other scholars advanced those ideas, he should be regarded as an important
figure in the history of argumentation, and argumentation scholars should prepare space for him in
the history. If those ideas still pose serious challenges to the community of argumentation scholars,
then the ideas should become key issues in theory of argumentation, and argumentation scholars
should consider him to be a key theorist of argumentation. The points interrogated in this section
collectively examine the significance of Peirce to theory and history of argumentation.
4.1 Interpretant and Argument
According to Peirce, the interpretant is a second sign that the original sign produces in a person's
mind, and the conclusion of the argument represents the interpretant that the premiss should
produce (2.253). In other words, the conclusion of the argument, when stated, is the interpretant
that the addressee of the argument ought to produce on a logical basis; when unstated, it is the
interpretant that the addressee of the argument ought to produce enthymematically. When the
addressee of the argument draws a conclusion equivalent to the one explicitly or implicitly offered
by the premiss of the argument, then the conclusion is judged to be a good one. The conclusion of
the argument ought to be such that the addressee would arrive at on the basis of the premiss. If we
follow the way in which Peirce conceptualizes the argument according to his semiosis, a key
question for argument evaluation will be: does the conclusion of the argument represent the
interpretant that addressees are expected to produce, on the basis of the given premiss?
Peirce's conception of argument is similar to Pinto's conception of an argument as an
invitation to inference. According to him (2001, p. 37), study of argument is different from that of
inference. The former presupposes the latter, and an evaluative question of an argument will
always ask: "ought the addressee to make the inference which the argument invites?" The
inference in Pinto's conceptualization functions similarly to the interpretant in Peirce's conception
based on his semiosis. In other words, if a person accepts that Pinto's position on argument and
inference poses an important question to the theorization of argument, then she or he should value
Peirce as a theorist of argument, and start investigating ways for situating theory of argument in
normative semiotics. In short, Peirce's ideas on interpretant and its relations to the argument pose
an important question on the nature of argument, inference, and reasoning, and therefore gives a
reason for Peirce to be inducted into a group of theorists like Toulmin, Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca, and Hamblin.
4.2 Semiosis Ad Infinitum and Argument Reconstruction

9

TAKUZO KONISHI

The previous subsection has demonstrated that an argument, understood as an invitation to
inference, looks close enough to the production of an interpretant (the conclusion) from the
sign/representamen (the premise). However, Peirce's conception of semiosis as an ad infinitum
process, and Eco's development of the unlimited semiosis (1976, 1995), pose a critical challenge to
the issue of argument reconstruction. Argument in natural language is often not fully spelled out,
and a critic of the argument must reconstruct it for a fair appraisal. However, when the argument
misses the conclusion, or the interpretant that the premiss should produce, a question arises where
the critic can stop. As section 3.1 has demonstrated, the original sign/representamen produces an
interpretant, or a second sign, which will in turn produce a third, which will in turn produce a
fourth, and the process will go on and on. In light of this infinite process of semiosis,
reconstructing the argument with the missing conclusion is not possible. If she stops at a certain
interpretant, then she clearly violates ad infinitum inherently embedded in the semiosis because the
inherent nature of semiosis forces her to supply further interpretants infinitely. Argumentation
scholars have discussed how to reconstruct an argument, but there would be no way to reasonably
reconstruct an argument with the missing conclusion, from a Peircean point of view. If there are no
ways for reasonable reconstruction, then reasonable evaluation of an argument of that type will be
extremely difficult. These points seem to pose important challenges on the argument
reconstruction and evaluation.
Some people may say that this problem is unique to Peirce's conception of the argument, and
if we show a clear dissimilarity between Pinto's conception of argument and that of Peirce, then
this charge will no longer apply. However, a standard conception of inference, or logical step of
moving from one statement to another, seems to be close enough to Peirce's conception of
interpretant, a second sign created by the original sign. Therefore, as long as the inference has
some bearing upon the argument, then the problem of ad infinitum will probably apply. The issue
of the interpretant ad infinitum merits a more thorough and careful consideration, but the very fact
that it merits further discussion makes Peirce a great contributor to theory of argumentation. 12
4.3 Iconic Sign and Argument
Peirce's second trichotomy of signs of icon, index, and symbol presents an interesting question to
the scope of the artifact in the study of argumentation. As previously noted, the icon includes such
visual artifacts as images and diagrams. Since argumentation scholars have already started
investigating the visual argument, Peirce's trichotomy can be a grounding theory to situate
different types of arguments--verbal and visual. However, his classification of ten classes of signs
does not associate the icon with the argument (2.254-64). According to him, the icon is associated
with the rheme but not with the dicisign and the argument. Within the second trichotomy, the
symbol is the only sign associated with the argument. If Peirce is correct, the visual argument will
be an oxymoron. If the visual argument does exist, then Peirce's theory of sign may need some
revision. Whichever may be the case, Peirce's conception of the icon and its relations to the
argument pose an important question for argumentation scholars interested in visual argument. An
adequate answer will require a more extensive analysis, but suffice it to say that Peirce had
prepared foundational issues on the visual argument long before it became a hot topic among
argumentation scholars. This point demonstrates Peirce's historical and theoretical contribution to
12

Eco (1995) discusses the relation between unlimited semiosis and Derrida's deconstruction. Govier (1996, p. xii)
expresses her concerns over the post-modern project on the meaning.
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argumentation.
4.4 Argumentation and Critical Thinking
Whether or not the visual artifact function as argument, it is amenable to careful analysis. This
raises a question regarding the evaluation of visual artifacts. If a visual artifact is not an argument,
then the evaluation of the artifact can fall in the domain of critical thinking but not in
argumentation. For example, figures 2 and 3 are clearly non-argumentative visual products. They
do not have the premise-conclusion structure, do not presuppose any difference of opinions, and
are not purposive use of signs in such dialogues as rational discussions, inquiries, political
deliberations, negotiations, or quarrels. They derive from the Nike logo and have a humorous
function. However, we can still think critically about adequacy of the interpretant that people draw
from figures 2 and 3. The T-shirt seems to raise questions about gender and sex labor, and both
T-shirt and souvenir raise questions regarding the copyright issue. The humor that figures 2 and 3
produce presupposes these issues, which are amenable to critical evaluation. Peirce's
comprehensive conception of different types of signs as well as their interpretant opens
possibilities for critical thinking of non-argumentative, non-linguistic artifacts. In fact, given that
Peirce's philosophy is geared more toward cognitive process in understanding signs and fixing
belief, but less toward communicating and sharing those fixed beliefs toward other inquirers in the
same community, his semiotics may have more implications to critical thinking than
argumentation. 13
4.5 Objection
Having shown how Peirce's conception of semiotics, semiosis and signs contribute to theory and
history of argumentation, let me handle one objection. People may say that that Peirce's semiotics
based on empirical science does not fit well with argumentation in non-scientific settings. Peirce's
semiotics, semiosis, and signs are so inextricably linked to his theories of scientific inquiry that
applying them to argumentation in non-scientific settings could be problematic. His definition of
semiotics clearly states use of signs by scientific intelligence, and the semiosis emphasizes
empirical observation and abstraction. Therefore the application of his semiotics should be limited
to scientific inquiry.
Although it is the case that his theory is strongly linked to empirical science, Peirce's slogan
"do not block the way of inquiry" justifies inquiries into possibilities of applying his theories to
non-scientific context. This is not the same as concluding that all parts of his theory would apply to
arguments in everyday discourse, but examining the extent to which they apply in non-scientific
contexts will constitute an important item on the research agenda. Given the scarcity of research by
argumentation scholars on Peirce as a semiotician, denying this path of the inquiry is rather
detrimental to advancing our understanding of Peirce, which in turn can impact the development of
theory and history argumentation. Walton has already started this line of investigation in his study
13

Scholars have discussed the relationship between critical thinking and argumentation. Fisher and Scriven (1997, p.
33) has advanced a thesis that informal logic (logic of argumentation) is metalevel reflexivity on critical thinking;
Govier (1987, pp. 237-241), Johnson and Blair (1996, p. 166) take a position that critical thinking is an educational
ideal that includes skills to evaluate arguments; and Sobocan (2003) argues that the difference between critical
thinking and informal logic is semantic and they teach the same skills based on the survey of textbooks. The examples
in this paper support a thesis that critical thinking is not exhausted by argumentation.
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of abduction. To many scholars in humanities disciplines, semiotics has become an important
approach to engage in critical acts of human sign use, not limited to empirical science. In addition,
Sebeok and Umiker-Sebeok (1980) has demonstrated that Peirce himself used abduction in a
non-scientific context to find out who stole his watch. Given these data, it seems to be too arrogant
to deny possibilities to apply Peirce's semiotics to non-scientific contexts simply because of its
origins in scientific inquiry. Scholars should be cautious in cross-disciplinary application of
theories, but argumentation scholars should follow Peirce, Walton, and semioticians in other fields,
and start investigating possibilities to de-scientize Peirce's semiotics and apply it to argumentation
and reasoning outside empirical science. Although this objection must be recognized, the
foregoing four issues—interpretant and conception of argument, semiosis ad infinitum and
argument reconstruction, potential inclusion of non-linguistic argument, and implications for
argumentation and critical thinking—justify the thesis that Peirce is an important figure both to the
theory and history of argumentation, and that argumentation scholars should study his ideas more
thoroughly.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to describe Peirce’s conceptions semiotics, semiosis and sign, and
advanced the claim that those conceptions involve important issues to the theory and history of
argumentation. His conception of argument as invitation to produce the interpretant, interpretant
ad infinitum and argument reconstruction, the icon and argument, and their implications for
argumentation and critical thinking collectively constitute important issues for theory and history
of argumentation. Given the time when he produced these ideas, the author believes that he should
get much better recognition from argumentation scholars.
In addition to further investigating the four issues listed in the previous section, topics that
merit further research on Peirce in the community of argumentation scholars include examination
of communicative aspects of his semiotics, arguers and the community. Although Peirce
emphasizes intersubjectivity in scientific inquiry, this paper has focused on his theories of sign and
semiosis and disregarded the role that intersubjectivity, dialogue, and communication play in his
semiotics. Since Peirce's conception of scientific inquiry involves this intersubjective dimension,
future research should attempt to connect his contribution to product (sign/abduction) to dialogic
dimension of his theory. Also, his conceptions of the human as the sign or the sign user, and the
community as a group of people involved in inquiries require further development in light of his
semiotics. Since his conception of the human and the community may have implications for
argumentation as human/social activity, clarifying these conceptions and connecting them to
argumentation and semiotics may offer us a fuller picture of Peirce's theory of argumentation that
can involve product, process, agent and social practice. It is too early to answer the question of
whether Peirce had theory of argumentation, but this paper seems to produce an interpretant that he
actually did. It is up to future research to determine what the overall picture of his theory of
argumentation is.
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